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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3595 
_____________ 
 
WILLIE SMITH, 
  Appellant 
                                                           
 v. 
 
JOHN KERESTES, Superintendent; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE 
COUNTY OF LAWRENCE 
 _____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-00048) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert C. Mitchell  
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 27, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 29, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Willie Smith appeals the order of the District Court1 dismissing his petition for 
habeas corpus pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 2254.   He contends that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer that would have resulted in a shorter 
sentence than he received after a trial and that his post-conviction review counsel was 
deficient for failing to raise such a claim in collateral proceedings.  For the following 
reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and therefore recite only the facts necessary to our 
disposition.  Smith was charged in Pennsylvania state court with fatally shooting 
Torrance Respress.  Smith admitted that he shot Respress; however, he contended that he 
did not intend to do so and that the gun accidentally went off when Smith attempted to 
strike Respress with it.  Evidence was also presented at trial that Smith was intoxicated at 
the time of the killing.  Smith’s counsel did not seek a jury instruction on voluntary 
intoxication because it would have conflicted with Smith’s position that he lacked the 
requisite intent for a murder conviction.   
 Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life 
on September 3, 2004.  On direct appeal, his conviction and sentence were affirmed.  
Commonwealth v. Smith, 890 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 2005) (unpublished memorandum).  
He did not petition for the allowance of an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
                                              
1 The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
636(c).  For ease of reference, we refer to the trial court as the District Court throughout 
this opinion. 
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 On May 24, 2006, Smith filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541, et seq.  
His petition was denied on December 20, 2006.  On appeal, Smith’s attorney stated that 
there were no arguably meritorious claims on which to base an appeal and Smith, pro se, 
argued that his PCRA counsel had been ineffective for failing to raise claims based on 
voluntary intoxication and issues with the jury pool.  The Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
vacated the order denying relief and remanded.  It found that two of Smith’s potential 
claims had arguable merit.  The remand order instructed the PCRA court to appoint new 
counsel to represent Smith in amending his PCRA petition to add ineffectiveness claims 
based on trial counsel’s failure to request a voluntary intoxication instruction and failure 
to object to an allegedly non-representative jury pool.   
 An amended PCRA petition was filed on June 19, 2008.  At a hearing on the 
amended petition, the Assistant District Attorney asked Smith:  “Do you remember [trial 
counsel] asking you about a guilty plea offer we had offered you a plea of guilty to third 
degree murder?”  Appendix (“App.”) 131–32.  Smith responded that “[h]e never brought 
that to my attention.  He never said anything to me about a plea, any kind of plea.”  Id. at 
132.  Later in the examination, the Assistant District Attorney asked whether Smith 
recalled telling his trial counsel that he could not take any plea because “that’s a life 
sentence for me.”2  Id. at 133.  Smith responded:  “No, I never told him that.  If I told him 
that . . . it was supposed to be between him and me.  How did you find out about it?”  Id.  
Smith’s trial attorney, in direct examination, confirmed that the Commonwealth had 
                                              
2 Smith was sixty-three at the time of his trial.   
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“offered a plea to third degree murder.”  Id. at 144.  He also testified that he informed 
Smith about the plea and recommended that he take it.  As the examination of Smith’s 
trial counsel continued, Smith interjected that he “never heard the offer before for a plea” 
and that trial counsel “never said anything about an offer for a plea.”  Id. at 151.  The 
PCRA court denied Smith’s amended petition on all counts.  Though failure to 
communicate the plea offer was not directly at issue in the proceeding, the PCRA court 
did note that “[t]he Commonwealth offered the Defendant a plea . . . and trial counsel 
presented the offer to the Defendant and explained . . . that this was a reasonable plea 
under the circumstances.”  Id. at 188. 
 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.  It held that trial counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to pursue a challenge to the jury process, failing to request a 
voluntary intoxication charge, or for failing to cross-examine a ballistics expert 
effectively.  The Superior Court did not directly rule on the issue of whether trial counsel 
had communicated the plea offer to Smith, but it did hold that it could not “disturb the 
PCRA court’s credibility determinations” on issues where “[Smith] and trial counsel[’s] . 
. . testimony differed.”  Id. at 198.  Leave to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
was denied on November 13, 2009.   
 Smith then filed a further PCRA petition pro se on December 10, 2009, alleging 
trial counsel’s failure to communicate the plea offer to him.  He filed this habeas petition 
shortly thereafter, on January 13, 2010, but requested a stay pending the resolution of his 
PCRA petition.  On April 23, 2012, the PCRA court found that the petition was untimely.  
Under the statute, to meet a timeliness exception for newly discovered information, a 
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claim must be filed within sixty days of discovering the new information.  Smith alleged 
that he discovered the plea offer at the hearing on July 21, 2008, but did not make that 
allegation until he filed his PCRA petition on December 10, 2009.  The PCRA court also 
found that he had waived his claim by failing to amend his PCRA petition when he 
discovered the new information.  As a further basis, the court found that the issue was 
previously litigated, reasoning that in denying the prior PCRA petition that court 
implicitly “accept[ed] the testimony of trial counsel and reject[ed] that of the defendant 
where their testimony conflicted.”  Id. at 244.  Finally, the PCRA court held that the 
claim must be denied “because there is no merit to the underlying claim.”  Id. at 246.  
Specifically, it found that the “instant claim that trial counsel failed to communicate a 
plea bargain . . . lacks credibility” and therefore that Smith’s “claim that he was never 
informed of a plea offer lacks merit.”  Id. at 247.  Smith appealed the PCRA court’s 
decision. 
 After his PCRA petition was dismissed, but while the appeal was pending, Smith 
filed a motion to reopen his federal habeas proceeding, which was granted.  The District 
Court dismissed Smith’s petition and denied a certificate of appealability.  As relevant 
here, the District Court found that Smith’s claim based on the failure to communicate the 
plea offer was untimely and therefore barred by an adequate and independent state 
procedural rule, and did not consider it on the merits.  The District Court did not consider 
the applicability of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. 
Ct. 1309 (2012).  Smith timely appealed the District Court’s dismissal of his habeas 
petition.  On March 7, 2013, we granted a certificate of appealability limited to the claim 
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that “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate an alleged plea offer.”  App. 
16.  We noted that “[w]hile the District Court held this claim to be procedurally 
defaulted, the issue is still being litigated in state court.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of Smith’s pro se petition on July 9, 2013.  It 
ruled on the timeliness issue only and did not address any of the PCRA court’s alternative 
holdings.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Smith’s petition for allowance of 
appeal on February 19, 2014.    
II.3 
  Smith argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
communicate the Commonwealth’s offer for him to plead guilty to third-degree murder.  
He admits that this claim is procedurally defaulted, Smith Br. 27, which ordinarily would 
preclude us from reviewing the claim, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 
(1991).  However, a habeas petitioner may be excused from a procedural default if he can 
show cause for the default and prejudice arising from failure to consider the claim.  See 
id. at 746–47.  The Supreme Court recently created a “narrow exception” to the 
procedural default rule in cases alleging ineffectiveness of collateral-review counsel. 
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.  The Supreme Court held that “[i]nadequate assistance of 
counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s 
procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3) and 2253.  Because the District Court held no 
evidentiary hearing, our review is plenary.  See Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
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1315.4  The failure of counsel at an initial-review collateral proceeding to raise a claim of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel may constitute cause if “(1) collateral attack counsel’s 
failure itself constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and (2) the 
underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to 
say the claim has some merit.”  Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 The District Court relied on Coleman and did not consider the impact of Martinez 
on Smith’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate the plea 
offer to him.  We will remand for the District Court to determine in the first instance 
whether Martinez excuses Smith’s procedural default and, if so, to rule on the merits of 
his underlying ineffectiveness claim.  See Atkins v. Holloway, 792 F.3d 654, 660 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (explaining this procedure).   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and 
remand for further proceedings. 
                                              
4 The exception applies only to “initial-review collateral proceedings,” defined as those 
where the “collateral proceeding[] . . . provide[s] the first occasion to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial.”  Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.  That requirement is 
satisfied here because of Pennsylvania’s general rule that “a petitioner should wait to 
raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.” 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002). 
